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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INES C. FOWLER, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) CASE NO. 14399 
HAROLD W* TAYLOR, dba ) 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for commissions earned as a real 
estate broker and real estate salesperson, and damages 
for breach of an employment agreement. There was a counter-
claim for breach of contract and libel. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment for respondent, Ines 
C. Fowler, in the amount $9,715.25 as a real estate broker's 
commission and $1,373.75 as a sales commission; dismissed 
her claim for damages for breach of an employment agreement; 
and dismissed Harold W. Taylor's counterclaim. Mr. Taylor's 
appeal challenges only that part of the judgment that awards 
Mrs. Fowler $9,715.25 for her services as a real estate 
broker. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September, 1971, Mrs. Fowler became a real estate 
salesman under the real estate broker's license of Monroe 
Tucker who was employed by Treasure Mountain Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Greater Park City Company engaged in the sale 
of condominiums and other real property in Park City, Utah. 
(T.29). Mr. Tucker received a 3 1/2 percent broker's sales 
commission for the sale of Treasure Mountain properties of 
which he paid a 2 1/2 percent sales commission to the sales-
men under his broker's license. (T.35). The services of 
Mr. Tucker were terminated and the Treasure Mountain sales-
men worked under the broker's license of Warren King, an 
officer and director of Greater Park City Company, and 
president and director of Treasure Mountain Corporation. 
(T.29). 
On December 29, 1972, Treasure Mountain Corporation 
filed a registration statement with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission because the condominiums were to be sold 
with rental pool management agreements and the company felt 
they might be deemed securities within the meaning of the 
Securities Act. (T.147). A prospectus was also published 
- 2 -
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for the Crescent Ridge and Payday condominiums. (T.48). 
Because securities were involved, Treasure Mountain 
Corporation deemed it necessary to hire an independent real 
estate and securities broker to handle the sale previously 
handled by the company itself. (T.46). On December 29, 
1972, Mr* Taylor entered into an agreement with Treasure 
Mountain Corporation whereby he would act as selling agent 
and would receive 3 1/2 percent commission for the sale of 
the condominium units. (Ex. P-12; T.109). 
Mr. Taylor did not have a real estate broker's license, 
and on or about December 20, 1972, he suggested to Mrs. 
Fowler that it would be a good idea for her to activate her 
license as a real estate broker. (T.30). At that time he 
presented to her some applications to the real estate 
division by the terms of which she would activate her license 
as a real estate broker, and Mr. Taylor, William H. Coleman, 
Trina Leonard, and David D. Scherer, would be licensed as 
salesmen under her brokerage. (T.30, 36; R.135). Appellant's 
purpose in requesting respondent to activate her real estate 
broker's license was to permit him in his sales organization 
to engage in the sales of the Crescent Ridge and Payday 
condominiums in accordance with his contract with Treasure 
Mountain Corporation, Mr. Taylor not then being licensed as 
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a real estate broker and not qualified for such a license. 
(T.30j R.135). There was no discussion of Mrs. Fowler's 
compensation for acting as real estate broker but both Mr. 
Taylor and Mrs. Fowler were aware of the custom among real 
estate brokers and salesmen for the real estate broker to 
receive a portion of the sales commission paid by a seller 
involving the sale of real property, and Mrs. Fowler expected 
that a broker's commission would be paid to her for her 
services. (T.34, 35, 153; R.136). It is customary for 
brokers to receive compensation for their- services. (T.81). 
Between January 1, 1913, and February 19, 1973, sales-
men working under Mrs. Fowler's real estate broker's license 
and Mr. Taylor's securities broker's license realized gross 
sales of $2,193,050.00, on which Treasure Mountain paid 
Mr. Taylor a 3 1/2 percent commission. (Ex. P-24; Ex. P-12) . 
Of this commission 2 1/2 percent was paid to the salesman 
who negotiated the particular sales, and one percent, or 
$21,930.50, was retained by Mr. Taylor. (R.136). Although 
Mrs. Fowler operated as a real estate broker, prepared 
forms, and arranged with Mr. Taylor for an opening of a 
trust account as required by Utah law, she received no 
compensation for her services or the use of her real estate 
broker's license. (T.35; R.131). According to Mr. Taylor's 
_ 4 -
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own figures, a maximum of $l,500o00 per month or $2,500.00 
during the period January 1, 1973, through February 19, 
1973, would be chargeable against the brokerage commissions 
for overhead. (R.136)« Reducing the brokerage commission by 
the $2,500.00 expended in connection with Mr, Taylor's 
operations as a selling agent leaves a net broker's commis-
sion after expenses of $19,430.50. (R.136). 
On February 19, 1973, Mr. Taylor succeeded in obtaining 
a real estate broker*s license, whereupon he arranged for the 
termination of the active broker's license of Mrs. Fowler and 
transfer of the salesmen to conduct future transactions under 
his own real estate broker's license. (T.35). 
The trial court found that Mr. Taylor orally engaged 
Mrs. Fowler to serve as real estate broker and salesman for 
the sale of condominiums owned by Treasure Mountain Corporation 
for a period from January 1, 1973, through February 19, 
1973 (R.135); that the Statute of Frauds has no application 
to the transaction between the parties since it did not 
involve the legal relationship between an owner and real 
estate salesman (R.139); that a broker's license was required 
by law for Mr. Taylor to discharge his contractual obliga-
tions to Treasure Mountain Corporation (R.131); that it is . 
customary in the real estate business that a percentage of 
- 5 -
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the sale of salesmen be paid to or retained by the broker 
under whose license the salesman operates (R.136); that Mrs. 
Fowler is entitled to $9,715.25, which is one-half of the 
net broker's commission of $19,430.50. (R.136, 139, 140). 
ARGUMENT 
I .;• V : ' . ' : ; . • , " ' " • " ' 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MRS. FOWLER'S 
CLAIM FOR A REAL ESTATE BROKER1 S COMMISSION FROM MR. TAYLOR 
IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, provides: 
Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. In the following cases every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
* * * 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or sell 
real estate for compensation. 
The purpose of this and similar statutes is to discourage 
unfounded claims for commissions between the broker or agent 
and the owner of land. The Statute of Frauds has no applica-
tion to agreements between brokers or a broker and a sales-
man, neither of whom is the owner of the land. The trial 
court correctly understood this distinction as evidenced by 
the following pertinent observations from its decision: 
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The Court concludes that the Statute of Frauds 
has no application to the transaction between 
the parties since it does not involve the legal 
relationship between an owner and real estate 
salesman* (R.130K 
The trial court*s decision is buttressed by the Utah 
case of Anderson v. Johnson,, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725 
(1945), wherein this court held that an agreement to assist 
a real estate broker in procuring listings of property for 
sale in consideration of a share of the commission was not 
within the Statute of Frauds. This court stated: 
The contention of respondent that plaintiff 
cannot recover because his agreement was oral 
is untenable. The contract was one of employ-
ment and not involving any right or interest 
in land. See Johnson v. Allen, Utah 1945, 158 
P. 2d 134 * The proposition that a contract for 
fee or commission may be recovered by agent 
from broker though not in writing is upheld in 
[citing cases from Californiaf Wyoming, Nebraska, 
and Louisiana]. 
There have been a great number of cases from other jur-
isdictions interpreting similar statutes, and they are quite 
harmonious in holding that such statutes are enacted to pro-
tect the owners of real property against claims by real estate 
brokers or salesmen. They do not require a written agreement 
between brokers, or between a broker and a salesman with respect 
to the sharing of real estate commissions payable by an owner 
or seller of real estate. The law is summarized in an annota-
tion, "Agreement between brokers as within statute requiring 
- 7 -
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agreements for commission for the sale of real estate to be 
in writing", 44 A.L.R. 2d 741, 745: 
While the statutes in particular jurisdictions 
differ in important respects, the more numerous 
referring either to "employment" of a broker, 
payment of a "commission" or requiring that the 
writing be signed by the "owner," there appears 
to be general agreement that such statutes, un-
less they specifically refer to an agreement be-
tween brokers, were designed specifically to pro-
tect owners of real estate against unfounded claims 
of brokers, and therefore are not applicable to 
agreements between brokers to pool their efforts 
and share in the commission thereby earned. 
Appellant relies on the cases of Baugh v. Parley, 112 
Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947), Case v. Ralph', 56 Utah 243, 188 
P. 640 (1920), Watson v. Ode11, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772 (1921) 
and Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 P. 915 
(1930) to support his argument that Mrs. Fowler's claim for 
a commission based upon an implied agreement is void under 
the Statute of Frauds. These cases are easily distinguished 
because they all involve dealings between owners of land and 
real estate brokers or salesmen. 
It is true, of course, that where an agreement is un-
enforceable because within the Statute of Frauds, the courts 
will not permit recovery on an implied contract or a quasi 
contract, because such recovery would thwart the prohibitions 
of the statute. However, where an implied or quasi contract 
does not run counter to the Statute of Frauds, there is no 
- 8 -
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reason for application of such a rule. In 37 C.J.S. Statute 
of Frauds § 229, this principle is stated in the following 
manner: 
The statute of frauds applies to contracts 
implied in fact, and hence if they fall 
within its scope they are unenforceable. 
This rule does not apply to an implied or 
inferred contract which does not fall with-
in the scope of the statute . . . (Emphasis 
added) 
Since the agreement wherein Mr. Taylor engaged Mrs, 
Fowler to serve as real estate broker and salesman is not 
within the Statute of Frauds, there is no rule which would 
prevent the court from raising an implied contract or per-
mitting recovery on the principle of restitution. 
Appellant's final argument, that even if 25-5-4(5) Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 pertains only to agreements between real 
estate brokers or agents and owners of real property, it 
would apply in the instant situation because Mr. Taylor was 
the agent or alter ego of the property owner, merits little 
consideration. The point is raised for the first time on 
this appeal; it contradicts the terms of the Treasure Moun-
tain prospectus (Ex. D-2, pp.1, 4) and the agreement between 
Taylor and Treasure Mountain (Ex. 12, p.6); and it has no 
support in the evidence. Even if Mrs. Fowler could not have 
enforced the agreement as against Treasure Mountain, it makes 
no difference because Treasure Mountain did pay the commissions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS AN 
AGREEMENT, IMPLIED IN FACT, THAT MR. TAYLOR WOULD PAY TO 
MRS. FOWLER THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HER SERVICES AS A REAL 
ESTATE BROKER. 
Activities of real estate brokers and real estate sales-
men, and their right to participate in commissions for the 
sale of real estate, are regulated by law. 
The following statutory provisions from Title 61, 
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are pertinent: 
61-2-1. License Required. - It shall 
be unlawful for any person, co-partnership or 
corporation to engage in the business, act in 
the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as 
a real estate broker or a real estate salesman 
within this chapter without first obtaining a 
license under the provisions of this chapter. 
61-2-10. Salesmen's Right To Commis-
sion Restricted. - It shall be unlawful 
for any real estate salesman to accept a 
commission or valuable consideration for the 
performance of any of the acts herein spe-
cified from any person, except his employer, 
who must be a licensed real estate broker. 
61-2-18. Unlicensed Broker - Action For 
Recovery of Compensation Prohibited - Action 
By Real Estate Salesmen. - (a) No person, 
partnership, association or corporation shall 
bring or maintain an action in any court of 
this state for the recovery of a commission, 
a fee, or compensation for any act done or 
service rendered the doing or rendering of 
which is prohibited under the provisions of 
this act to other than licensed real estate 
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed 
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time 
of doing such act or the rendering of such 
service. 
- 10 -
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(b) No real estate salesman shall have 
the right to institute suit in his own name 
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
compensation for services as a real estate 
salesman except where the action is against 
the broker but any such action shall be in-
stituted and brought by the broker with whom 
the salesman is connected. 
In order for Mr. Taylor to carry out the obligations of 
his contract with Treasure Mountain Corporation, it was 
necessary that the salesmen within the organization operate 
under the license of a real estate broker, pursuant to the 
provisions of 61-2-1. When Mr. Taylor requested Mrs. Fowler 
to renew her license, the circumstances were such that a 
person in his position would ordinarily be expected to 
compensate her for her services, and a person in Mrs. Fowler's 
position would ordinarily expect compensation. Mrs. Fowler 
testified that she expected to receive a brokerfs commission 
of one percent, the same rate paid to previous brokers: 
Q (By Mr. Roe) Mrs. Fowler, was there any 
discussion with respect to brokerage commissions: 
A He only said that it was good for me to 
activate my license. 
Q So the subject wasn't mentioned at all? 
A No, not at all. He didn't approach the 
subject. 
Q At that time what expectations did you 
have, if any, respecting commissions? 
- 11 -
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A Well, all the sales for Treasure Mountain 
Corporation had been done on the premises that the 
Broker will get one percent commission on all sales. 
Q And that was your expectation? 
A And that was my expectation. He was the 
Salesman and I was the Broker, and I expected to be 
paid as a Broker. (T.34, 35). 
It is customary among real estate brokers and sales-
men for the broker to receive a portion of the selling 
commission. This is established not only by the custom and 
practice with relation to the sale of the Treasure Mountain 
condominiums, where both before and after /the Taylor-Treasure 
Mountain contract the broker received a one percent commission 
and the salesman received a 2 1/2 percent commission on the 
sales of condominiums, but it is true among real estate 
agents and brokers generally. Robert Monson, who testified, 
in behalf of Mr. Taylor, stated that it was customary for 
real estate brokers to receive a percentage of the commission. 
In E. Friedman, Real Estate Encyclopedia (Prentice 
Hall, 1960), it is stated: 
SHARING OF BROKER'S COMMISSION: A salesman is 
paid for his services by his employer. His 
compensation generally consists of a percentage 
of the broker's commission earned on sales made 
by the salesman. The salesman is not entitled 
to collect commissions direct from principals. 
Each real estate organization establishes its 
own schedule for division of commissions be-
tween the employer and its salesmen. Some 
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real estate organizations pay their salesmen 
50% of commissions earned, others pay 40% with 
10% to the supervisor. In some firms, step-ups 
are provided? if the brokerage commission ex-
ceeds a certain amount, an additional 5% may 
be paid; above that amount, a further percent-
age may be allowed. 
And see A. Ring, Real Estate Principles and Practices 
Chapter 18 (Prentice Hall, 1972): 
The compensation of a salesman depends entirely 
on his arrangement with his employer, the broker. 
A novice may receive a small salary and a small 
share of any commissions earned by the broker as 
a result of the salesman's work. As he gains in 
experience and usefulness, his compensation changes* 
Ultimately he reaches a point at which his compen-
sation is from 40 to 60% of the brokerage paid on 
his transactions, quite possibly with a drawing ac-
count against such earnings. 
The circumstances under which the brokerage services 
were performed by Mrs. Fowler are such that the court should 
find a contract implied-in-fact under which Mr. Taylor 
agreed to pay her the reasonable value of those services. 
With respect to implied-in-fact contracts, the following 
statement is found in 17 Am.Jur. 2d Contracts § 4: 
There is a wide variety of particular cir-
cumstances under which contracts will be 
implied~in-fact. Thus, where a person per-
forms services, furnishes property, or ex-
pends money for another at the other's re-
quest and there is no express agreement as 
to compensation, the promise to pay the 
reasonable value of the services or property 
or to reimburse for money expended may pro-
perly be implied where, but only where, the 
circumstances warrant such an inference. 
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Generally, there is an implication of a pro-
mise to pay for valuable services rendered 
with the knowledge and approval of the re-
cepient, in the absence of a showing to the 
contrary. A promise to pay the reasonable 
value of the service is implied where one 
performs for another, with the other's know-
ledge, a useful service of a character that 
is usually charged for, and the latter ex-
presses no dissent or avails himself of the 
service. * * * 
That contracts may be implied in fact, without express 
agreement, was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Kimball Elevator Company v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 
2d 289, 272 P.2d 583 (1954). Although the court failed to 
find an implied contract in that case, it stated the general 
rule as follows: 
It is of course conceded that a contract may 
be made out even though there be no express 
words formally stating it, and that the 
promise may be inferred wholly or in part 
from such conduct as justifies the promisee 
in understanding that the promisor intended 
to make it. 
And see Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465 
(1957), wherein the Utah Supreme Court, in upholding a find-
ing of an implied contract, said: 
It is sufficient for our purposes to affirm 
the court's ruling because it is well es-
tablished that the meeting of minds necessary 
for the formation of a contract can be found 
from conduct and circumstances as well as by 
verbal expression. 
- 14 -
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It is generally held that where one engages or accepts 
beneficial services of another for which compensation is 
customarily made and naturally anticipated# even though 
there is no expressed agreement for compensation, the law 
implies an understanding or intent to pay the value of the 
services rendered. In Florey v. Sinkey, 77 Nev. 275, 362 
P. 2d 271 (1961), the plaintiff real estate broker brought an 
action for the reasonable value of his services in procuring 
a purchaser for defendant's mining property. No agreement 
to pay compensation was entered into by the parties, but 
evidence was presented that it was a custom in the area for 
the seller of mining property to pay 10 percent of the 
consideration actually received by him to the person who was 
the procuring cause of the sale. The trial court determined 
that the custom was sufficiently known to charge the defendant 
with constructive knowledge of the same and held that there 
was an implied agreement to pay plaintiff the reasonable 
value of his services. On appeal the Nevada Supreme Court 
stated: 
The trial court found that there was an 
implied agreement on the part of Florey 
to pay Sinkey the reasonable value of his 
services, and as there was substantial 
evidence in support of such finding, as 
well as the other findings of the trial 
court, the same may not be disturbed on 
- 15 -
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this appeal. The amount found to be the 
reasonable value of Sinkey's services was 
the same as 10% of the $84,000 found to 
have been actually received by Florey from 
Kaufmann. In effect, the sum found to be 
due Sinkey as compensation for his services, 
under the established custom of the mining 
locality, became the reasonable value of 
such services. (Citations omitted.) 362 
P.2d at 273. 
Appellant concedes that where no compensation is agreed 
upon in advance for services requested by and performed by 
another, there is a presumption that compensation was intended. 
However, the contention is made that the presumption is re-
butted by the circumstances of this particular case. 
Appellant's primary argument is that Mrs. Fowler's 
strong self-interest in complying with Mr. Taylor's request 
to activate her real estate broker's license negates any 
inference of an implied-in-fact agreement for compensation. 
However, appellant fails to take into consideration that 
Mrs. Fowler's self-interest is no different than the interest 
of any other broker in having salesmen working under him and 
sharing in the commissions from their sales. Mrs. Fowler 
would not have taken on the added responsibility and potential 
liability of acting as real estate broker without expecting 
additional compensation. Appellant was not justified in 
assuming that Mrs. Fowler would comply with his request to 
- 16 -
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act as real estate broker and then receive only the standard 
2 1/2 percent sales commission on her sales. 
Appellants second and third arguments in support of 
his contention that there was no implied-in-fact agreement 
is that there was no agreement between the parties respecting 
compensation and that the intentions of the parties as to 
compensation were clearly contrary to each other. There is 
no basis for these arguments, as the law requires neither an 
agreement nor similar intentions of the parties for the 
court to find an implied agreement for compensation. To 
find an implied-in-fact contract, there must be mutual 
assent of the parties to contract but there is no requirement 
of mutual assent as to compensation. Florey v. Sinkey, 
supra. 
In the case at bar, the mutual assent required was 
simply that both Mr. Taylor and Mrs. Fowler agree that Mrs. 
Fowler would act as real estate broker. After this fact 
was established, the court properly found an implied-in-fact 
agreement to pay Mrs. Fowler reasonable compensation for her 
services. The law in this regard is summarized in the 
following manner: 
If there is no agreement fixing the com-
pensation which a broker is to receive for his 
services, but there is a well-established custom 
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in the neighborhood with respect to the amount 
of compensation to which a broker is entitled, 
the law implies a promise on the part of the 
person employing him to pay the usual and cus-
tomary commissions* If no such custom or us-
age can be shown, the broker is entitled to 
reasonable compensation. 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers 
§ 161. 
In the absence of a special agreement as to 
the matter, the broker is entitled to a fair 
and reasonable compensation for his services. 
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 78. 
In this case the evidence shows there was a well es-
tablished custom within the sales organization of Treasure 
Mountain Corporation to pay the broker a one percent com-
mission on the sales price of all units sold. The court 
properly found an implied agreement to compensate Mrs. 
Fowler in a similar manner. 
Appellant's final argument in support of his contention 
that the court erred in finding an implied agreement is that 
there can be no implied-in-fact contract where the law with 
respect to such contract has not been complied with. Appel-
lant cites Rule 19 of the Utah State Securities Commission, 
Real Estate Division, as requiring brokers to provide sales-
men with the terms of employment in writing to avoid mis-
understandings, and Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1974) for the proposition that no contractual liability 
can be created without compliance with the applicable ordin-
ances. The case involved an ordinance that voided contracts 
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not signed by the City Recorder. 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable in that 
no voiding ordinance is involved. Instead, Rule 19 of the 
rules and regulations issued by the Department of Business 
Regulation, Real Estate Division, requires that brokers 
provide salesmen with the terms of their employment in 
writing, but provides no sanction for failure to do so. In 
addition^ this rule was enacted for the protection of real 
estate salesmen, who stand to benefit only if they can 
recover on oral or implied contracts when the broker has 
failed to designate in writing the terms of their employment. 
To construe the rule as contended by appellant would be a 
clear misapplication of the law. 
The evidence in this case shows that there is a cus-
tom and practice among real estate brokers and salesmen 
that the broker will share in the commission; there was a 
particular custom with respect to the sales made for 
Treasure Mountain Corporation; Mrs. Fowler activated her 
real estate broker's license with the expectation that she 
would receive a brokerage commission; and Mrs. Fowler's 
brokerage services were beneficial to Mr. Taylor. The cir-
cumstances, therefore, contain all the elements of a contract 
implied-in-fact and support the lower court's decision• 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THERE WAS AN 
AGREEMENT, IMPLIED IN LAW, THAT MR. TAYLOR WOULD PAY TO 
MRS. FOWLER THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HER SERVICES AS A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER. 
Mrs. Fowler is entitled to recover for the value of her 
brokerage services on principles of restitution, or qtiasi 
contract. Valuable services were performed on behalf of 
Mr. Taylor at his request, and he received a benefit by 
virtue of the performance of those services, i.e., he was 
able to perform his contract with Treasure Mountain Corpora-
tion for the sale of condominiums. Without Mrs. Fowler's 
active broker's license, the sales program could not have 
proceeded. 
The most general statement of rule regarding restitu-
tion is found in Restatement of Restitution § 1: 
A person who has been unjustly enriched 
at the expense of another is required to make 
restitution to the other. 
With respect to benefits conferred at request, the 
following is found in Restatement of Restitution § 107: 
(1) A person of full capacity who, pur-
suant to a contract with another, has performed 
services or transferred property to the other 
or otherwise has conferred a benefit upon him 
is not entitled to compensation therefor other 
than in accordance with the terms of such bar-
gain, unless the transaction is rescinded for 
fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence or il-
legality, or unless the other has failed to 
perform his part of the bargain. 
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(2) In the absence of circumstances in-
dicating otherwise, it is inferred that a per-
son who requests another to perform services 
for him or to transfer property to him thereby 
bargains to pay therefor, (Emphasis added) 
Another statement of the rule is found in 66 Am.Jur. 
2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 21: 
The performance of services at the request 
of another confers a benefit upon such other 
within the principle that a person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is 
required to make restitution to the other. In 
the absence of circumstances indicating other-
wise, it is inferred that a person who requests 
or orders another to perform services for him 
thereby bargains to pay for the services rendered. 
Where services are rendered or materials are 
furnished upon request, it is ordinarily a reason-
able inference that the parties understand and 
agree that they are to be paid for, and accord-
ingly, one rendering services or furnishing 
materials at another's request ordinarily may 
recover from the other in quantum meruit for 
the value thereof. The law will imply an agree-
ment to pay the reasonable worth of services 
performed for another at the latter1s special 
instance and request where there is no agree-
ment with reference to compensation to be paid. 
In McCollum v. Clother, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 
(1952), the trial court granted judgment for plaintiff in 
quantum meruit for services rendered and travel expenses 
incurred in securing buyers and bidders on certain machinery 
and equipment which was sold for defendant's benefit at a 
sheriff's sale after foreclosure of a mortgage. There was 
no agreement for compensation, but the Supreme Court held 
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that the trial court had properly found an implied contract 
to pay for the services. The court said: 
The question of moment, thenf is as to 
the authorization of this work. The rule 
applicable to the situation is contained in 
the Restatement of Agency, Volume 2, Section 
441: "Except where the relationship of the 
parties, the triviality of the services, or 
other circumstances indicate that the parties 
have agreed otherwise, it is inferred that one 
who requests or permits another to perform 
services for him as his agent promises to pay 
for them." (Citing cases and authorities.) 
It is appreciated that this rule should 
not be applied to bind one under implied con-
tract who merely permits services to.be ren-
dered him, or accepts benefits from another, 
under such circumstances that he may reason-
ably assume they are given gratuitiously. The 
law should not require everyone to keep on guard 
against such possibilities by warning persons 
offering services that no pay is to be expected. 
It is, therefore, essential that the court should 
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of 
an implied contract, as contrasted to express 
contract where the parties have actually defined 
and agreed to the terms they are to be bound 
by. With such caution in mind, the test for the 
court to apply was: under all the evidence, 
were the circumstances such that the plaintiff 
could reasonably assume he was to be paid and 
that the defendant should have reasonably ex-
pected to pay for such services. 
Appellant cites the cases of Baugh v. Parley, supra, 
and Rapp v. Salt Lake City, supra, to support his argument 
that Mrs. Fowler cannot obtain quasi-contractual relief. 
These cases are readily distinguishable. In the former 
- 22 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case, the court refused to award plaintiff the value of his 
services on the basis that the defendant did not receive any 
real benefit from plaintiff's actions and that the purpose 
of the Statute of Frauds would be nullified by granting quan-
tum meruit relief. In the latter case a quasi-contractual 
remedy was not allowed, on the statutory grounds previously 
referred to (all contractual obligations with the city are 
void without satisfying the requisite formalities), and 
also because the action was basically a tort claim for 
deceit; to obtain quasi-contract relief, the obligation must 
more closely resemble a contract action than a tort claim. 
Mrs. Fowler performed valuable services for Mr. Taylor 
under circumstances in which he would be expected to pay for 
them. They were conferred at his request; they were bene-
ficial to him; and they fulfilled an obligation that he had 
to Treasure Mountain Corporation, i.e., to obtain the neces-
sary licenses to carry out the corporation's sales program. 
Mrs. Fowler is entitled to restitution for the reasonable 
value of the benefit conferred. 
IV . 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY COMPUTED THE VALUE OF 
MRS. FOWLER'S BROKERAGE SERVICES AT $9,715.25. 
The trial court's computation of damages is set forth 
in page 2 of its decision: 
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The Court finds that the sales made by 
salesmen during the period in question total-
ed $2,193,053.00, that the brokers commissions 
based on one percent of this price equals 
$21,930.50, that the expenses required to be 
paid in the operation of the broker's office 
and expended by the defendant was the sum of 
$2,500.00 reducing the net commissions to 
$19,430.50. Of this amount the plaintifff 
would be entitled to one-half or the sum of 
$9,715.25 since the Treasure Mountain agree-
ment with defendant included his services as 
Securities Broker as well as that of Real Es-
tate Broker, which plaintiff served as during 
said period. (R.131). 
Appellant concedes that if Mrs. Fowler is entitled to 
recovery of damages, the measure of recovery would be the 
reasonable value of her services. However, appellant con-
tends that the "50-50 split" used by the court in arriving at 
the amount of judgment does not reflect the reasonable value 
of Mrs. Fowler*s services. 
Contrary to appellant's contention, in the absence of 
an express agreement, a "50-50 split" is the reasonable 
method to divide commissions between brokers. In 12 Am.Jur. 
2d Brokers § 177, the general law is expressed as follows: 
The amount recoverable under an agree-
ment between brokers to divide or share com-
missions would appear to depend largely upon 
the terms of the particular agreement, the 
extent of the services performed, and the 
circumstances of the particular case. It 
would seem that in the absence of a contrary 
stipulation, an agreement for a division of 
compensation would contemplate an equal 
division. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
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The court's assumption that one-half of the net com-
mission was to be paid to Mrs. Fowler for her services as 
real estate broker and one-half of the net commission was 
to be paid to Mr. Taylor for his services as securities 
broker gave to each party compensation for the reasonable 
value of their services and was the most equitable decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Fowler performed valuable services as real estate 
broker for Treasure Mountain Corporation at the request and 
for the benefit of the appellant, Mr. Taylor. Although there 
was no agreement fixing the amount of compensation Mrs. 
Fowler was to receive for her brokerage services, the trial 
court correctly determined that she was entitled to reason-
able compensation. The court's decision is supported either 
under a theory of unjust enrichment or by implying a promise 
on the part of Mr. Taylor to pay Mrs. Fowler the reasonable 
value of her services. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Terry L. Christiansen 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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